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On September 10, 2014, President Obama addressed the nation, in his speech he issued a national 
vendetta against the terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant. The president 
proposed a plan to conduct a campaign of coordinated airstrikes to “degrade and ultimately destroy 
ISIL”; assuring the United States would not deploy any ground troops. More recently, on February 11, 
2015, Obama formally requested Congress to authorize the use of Military Force to combat the Islamic 
State, which would procure the possibility of U.S. ground forces entering the conflict. In his appeal to 
congress, the Obama administration outlined the impending threats posed by ISIL, exhibiting a 
necessity for the U.S. to intervene on a larger scale, “Whereas the terrorist organization that has 
referred to itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and various other names (in this resolution 
referred to as ‘‘ISIL’’) poses a grave threat to the people and territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria, 
regional stability, and the national security interests of the United States and its allies and 
partners”(Egan, 2015).
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The United States has called upon its allies to take part in a U.S. led coalition to combat the terrorist 
group ISIL. The State Department lists 60 countries as members of the “Coalition to Degrade and Defeat 
ISIL.” Many of the countries participating have been involved since 2012 in response to the evolving 
conflict in Syria” (Katzman, et al., 2015). The United States’ military policy in the Middle East has 
created optimal conditions for the radicalization of Muslims in the region, strengthening the extremist 
militias and validating the doctrines of Islamic radicals sworn to combating the U.S. government. 
Despondent circumstances, persisted by the U.S. military in the Middle East, reinforced the Islamic 
States’ influence in the Middle East.
The Islamic State has seized large portions of Iraq and Syria, declaring a new Islamic Caliphate, naming 
Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi as the Caliph. ISIL has committed atrocious acts of violence during their rapid 
ascent to power and have repeatedly issued threats against the United States. “ISIL has threatened 
genocide and committed vicious acts of violence against religious and ethnic minority groups, 
including Iraqi Christian, Yezidi, and Turkmen populations” (Egan, 2015). The United States’ military 
commitments in the Middle East have amplified feelings of rage and resentment among the populations 
it is claiming to liberate. These increasingly negative sentiments have given a degree of validity to the 
creeds of radicalized Islamic militants committed to fighting the United States, effectively adding to our 
enemy’s ranks.
By meeting ISIL’s calls for battle, the U.S. continues to fall for the fallacy that extremism can be bombed 
to extinction. The United States’ military involvement in the Middle East and its ongoing war on 
terrorism has continually oppressed Islamic populations in the region by exposing them to excessive 
instances of overt violence. “Until policymakers examine the causes of ISIS’ appeal, and begin dealing 
with them, destroying ISIS will only give rise to an equally extreme group in its place. Military power 
alone seldom succeeds in defeating an adversary that is willing to die to achieve its goal” (Marshall, 
2014). The Islamic State has certainly contested the U.S. government.  However, meeting their threats 
with a military response will only increase ISIL’s influence and power in the Middle East.
Soldiers participating in the U.S. military campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan faced a serious challenge; 
their enemy was concealed within the general population, held no definite territory, and did not display 
a distinct uniform. The only method of distinguishing combatants from civilians was whether or not 
the person in question was carrying a weapon. These conditions increase the possibility for error and 
expand collateral damage. As military technology has improved, there has been “an increase in human, 
environmental, and economic costs of war, a decrease in the casualty rating of combatants, and an 
increase in the number of civilian casualties” (Barash and Webel, 2002). The extensive use of U.S. 
weapons in heavily populated areas decimated Iraq’s infrastructure and killed intolerable quantities of 
civilians, breeding anti-American sentiments within the region.
A statistical analysis of Iraqi civilian casualties conducted in the summer of 2006 and published in the 
Lancet Journal found, “that as of July, 2006, there have been an estimated 654,965 excess Iraqi deaths 
as a consequence of the war, which corresponds to 2.5 percent of the population in the study area. Of 
post-invasion deaths, an estimated 601,027 were due to violence, the most common cause being 
gunfire” (Burnham, Gilbert, Lafta, Doocy, & Roberts, 2006). The analysis excluded samples taken from 
Fallujah as outliers that would unreasonably skew national data.
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Alienation of the Iraqi public by the dreadfully powerful U.S. military produced a prevalent crisis 
throughout Iraq. The violence, destruction, and humiliation experienced by the Iraqi people perverted 
their perception of American benevolence causing them to view the U.S. military as invaders and 
occupiers rather than liberators. During times of desperation and crisis people desperately seek 
solutions to their troubles.  For some Iraqis the only appropriate response was to join the growing 
insurgency in Iraq to expel the U.S. invaders. “Intuitively it often seems that periods of large-scale 
societal instability and uncertainty coincide with sociopolitical and ideological extremism” (Hogg, 
Kruglanski, & Den Bos, 2013). The desperation and violence in Iraq, perpetuated by U.S. military 
operations in the region, attributed to ripe conditions for insurgency recruitment.
The Islamic State traces its origins to Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ), a Sunni Islamic militant group 
founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (AMZ). JTJ’s dedication to U.S. insurgency efforts in Iraq in the early 
2000’s bolstered their recognition amongst jihadists. In 2004, JTJ unified with al-Qaeda, and AMZ’s 
militants acquired the new title al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). A strategic decision for AMZ, “al-Qaeda in Iraq 
provided al-Qaeda with a ready-made base from which to strike the United States and AMZ with 
prestige. He was now part of a brand name that drew recruits and financial and logistical 
support” (Hashim, 2002). Soon after AMZ pledged his allegiance to al-Qaeda there was a growing 
concern among al-Qaeda leadership over AMZ’s tactics and attitudes toward the Iraqi Shia population. 
AMZ regarded Shia Muslims with a profound loathing, frequently targeting Iraqi Shia populations 
using suicide bombers, “AMZ’s tactic of engaging in mass civilian casualties, earning him the sobriquet 
“sheikh of the slaughterers,” aroused grave concern” (Hashim, 2002).
In June 2006, U.S. intelligence tracked AMZ to a farmhouse north of Bagdad; the U.S. military dropped 
two, five hundred pound bombs on their target. The U.S. was quick to declare an apparent victory. 
However, AMZ left behind a potent legacy and over 12,000 Islamic extremist fighters.  “Soon 
afterward, the organization announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the 
leadership of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi” (Hashim, 2002). The first Islamic State project was a 
disappointment, their crusade failed to garner support from Sunni populations and other insurgent 
groups. Many radicals believed ISI’s goals deviated from the prevailing obligation of expelling the U.S. 
occupation. In addition, ISIL did not have the supplies or authority to rule over their acquired territory.
By the end of 2008, the ISI threat was supposedly extinguished, it seemed Iraq was returning to a state 
of normalcy. In the following years U.S. troops began to withdraw from Iraq leaving behind a failing 
democracy, wavering security forces, and increasing sectarian violence. The systematic destruction of 
ISI’s leadership in 2010 permitted the Islamic State’s most successful leader Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi, to 
assume control of the organization.
Abu Bakr al-Bagdadi was able to construct a sizeable and militarily effective organization capable of 
administering an area roughly the size of the United Kingdom. He undertook vast reforms, 
constructing a more, “cohesive, disciplined and flexible organization” (Hashim, 2002). The Islamic 
State has taken advantage of political and social instability in the Middle East to advance their 
expansion. The Syrian civil war and Iraqi sectarian violence, combined with political and military 
volatility in the region, endangered legitimate government’s footholds on their territory.
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The Islamic State has effectively established governmental institutions in their occupied territory, 
thereby strengthening their foothold in the region and generating funds to continue their crusade. ISIL 
has established Sharia Law in their subjugated territory, implementing courts and law enforcement to 
administer their new edicts. The courts and laws established under ISIL are largely considered a brutal 
fundamentalists interpretation of crime and punishment. In addition to Islamic courts, ISIL has 
established educational institutions in accordance with their harsh interpretation of Islamic values. 
Many young men in the occupied territory attend military training, while the women attend separate 
schools designed to naturalize them into lives as devote Muslim women. The Islamic State collects taxes 
and zakat, or charity, from civilians under their control and is capable of producing approximately 
thirty thousand barrels of oil each day. The oil they produce is sold on the black market at a highly 
discounted rate, still providing the terrorist group with a significant amount of funds.
The White House has taken a multilateral approach to combating ISIL. In addition to conducting 
airstrikes, “President Obama has authorized the deployment of approximately 3,100 U.S. military 
personnel to Iraq for the purpose of advising Iraqi forces, gathering intelligence on the Islamic State, 
and securing U.S. personnel and facilities” (Katzman, et al., 2015). Two-thirds of the military personnel 
in Iraq advise and train the Iraq Security forces and the Kurdish Peshmerga, both are essential for 
ground operations against ISIL. The United States has also sought to stem the flow of foreign fighters 
and funds to further degrade the Islamic States’ military and administrative capabilities. “The United 
States seeks to disrupt the group’s revenue streams by targeting those who refine, transport, handle, or 
sell IS oil” (Katzman, et al., 2015).
In addition to disrupting the Islamic States’ oil revenues, the United States seeks to disrupt funds 
flowing through financial institutions, “the United States aims to restrict the Islamic State’s access to 
the international financial system and to limit its ability to move, store, and use funds it acquires 
locally” (Katzman, et al., 2015). Reducing ISIL’s flow of funds and troops is essential for the success of 
the U.S. led coalition. If carried out successfully, these initiatives will cripple ISIL’s ability to operate.
To maintain a state of peace in the Middle East, the United States must reform its foreign and military 
policies, emphasizing humanitarian aid and diplomacy rather than military action. If the United States 
is to win the hearts and minds of the world, it must do so with humanitarian fulfillments, not acts of 
violence. “Surely, the surprises, disappointments, and woeful even shameful failures of the Iraq War 
make clear the need to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. military policy” (Bacevich, 2013).
The amount of money spent combating enemies that seemingly pose no direct threat to national 
security could be better utilized at home and abroad. Humanitarian aid distributed by the U.S. 
throughout the Middle East, instead of bombs and bullets, would remove the legitimacy of the claims 
made by radicalized Islamic militant groups fighting the United States. The approach would weaken the 
Islamic States’ ability to recruit additional fighters and intensify the prospect of the general population 
rejecting the terrorist groups reign.
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